What do we know about competition agencies in emerging and transition countries? Evidence on workload, personnel, priority sectors, and training needs by Serebrisky, Tomas
  1
 
What Do We Know about Competition Agencies  
in Emerging and Transition Countries? 
 





















World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3221, February 2004 
 
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to 
encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get 
the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry 
the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and 
conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily 
represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. 







                                                 
1 World Bank Institute. Email: tserebrisky@worldbank.org. I would like to thank Antonio Estache and Paul Noumba 



















































































































In the last decade many emerging and transition countries passed competition laws and 
created competition agencies to enforce them. The importance given by these countries to 
competition policy is growing and parallels, sometimes with a lag, a process of liberalization and 
increasing private sector participation in the economy. Many recent international initiatives
2 in 
the area of competition policy, the collaboration of the European Commission with Accession 
countries, the multilateral programs by UNCTAD and OECD and the bilateral agreements signed 
by the United States show the growing interest in fostering the role of competition agencies and 
enhancing their capacity. 
During 2003, the World Bank Institute sent a needs assessment questionnaire to 48 
competition agencies in transition and emerging countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin 
America. This questionnaire has many objectives, the most important being the identification of 
areas where competition agencies in emerging and transition countries need to invest in human 
capital. The performance of a competition agency depends on many variables, such as financial 
resources, independence and the legal and political environments. Although the combination of 
these variables and many others influences the outcomes of a competition agency, human capital 
endowment stands out as a key explanatory factor of performance. Despite the emphasis on 
training areas, the needs assessment questionnaire also provides valuable data about competition 
agencies’ workload (mergers and anticompetitive conduct cases), personnel endowment and 
priority infrastructure sectors. 
The World Bank Institute’s needs assessment questionnaire complements other initiatives 
in the area of competition policy. For instance, in the in the last two years, the International 
Competition Network
3 conducted detailed questionnaires among its members to address specific 
competition policy areas (advocacy, merger procedures and competition policy implementation). 
The OECD has also been involved in a series of capacity building initiatives and reviews of 
competition laws and policies.  
                                                 
2 The International Competition Network, the Latin American Competition Forum in the internet and the courses 
organized by the Spanish Competition Tribunal for Latin American competition agencies are examples of 
international initiatives recently created. 
3 An international body created in October 2001 that seeks to provide competition authorities with a specialized 
venue for maintaining regular contacts and addressing practical competition concerns   3
The results of the needs assessment questionnaire are classified according to the World 
Bank’s analytical regional grouping. We received 35 survey responses. Due to the number of 
responses received from each region, we opted to present the results only for three regions: East 
Asia and Pacific (EAP), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA). We believe that the survey responses are a representative sample and the substantive 
results presented in this analysis are meaningful in identifying needs and determining priorities. 
The results are organized in figures and tables that compare the three regions selected - East Asia 
and Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and Europe and Central Asia. We analyze 
the main results and describe the problems in the design and interpretation of the questionnaire. 
  Important evidence and lessons can be drawn from this needs assessment questionnaire. 
Responses clearly indicate that competition agencies consider the institutional set up phase to be 
accomplished and they currently need to improve their capacity to solve technically complex 
mergers and anticompetitive conduct cases. Usually, the most challenging cases are those that 
involve regulated infrastructure sectors that are operated by the private sector. Competition 
agencies consider that regulatory agencies as well as members of the judicial branch of 
government need to participate in competition policy courses to achieve an effective 
implementation of competition laws. As important as the lessons for the design of competition 
courses, the questionnaire provides a detailed picture of competition agencies’ workload, 
personnel endowment and priority sectors. The view of competition authorities as a homogenous 
group across countries and regions can be strongly discarded. The analysis of the needs 
assessment questionnaire shows there are significant heterogeneities among competition 
agencies’ mandates, exempted sectors, professional personnel endowment and capacity needs. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the sample and responses 
received. Section III presents the results on the scope of competition laws, level of activity of 
competition agencies, personnel endowment and relevance of selected infrastructure sectors. 
Some lessons for the design of training courses are introduced in section IV. Section V provides 
some policy implications and section 6 concludes.  
 
II. Sample and responses received 
 
The questionnaire was sent to 48 emerging and transition countries in Africa, Asia, 
Europe and South and Central America between February and July of 2003. A total of 35   4
answers were received, the last one in September 2003. A copy of the questionnaire is attached at 
the end of the paper. 
  Table 1 classifies the responses according to the World Bank’s analytical regional 
grouping. 
 
Table 1: Responses by region 
Regions Responses  Countries 
Africa  2  Zambia, Burkina Faso 
East Asia and Pacific  5  Korea, Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, Indonesia 
East Europe and Central 
Asia 
14  Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Russian 
Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Serbia 
Montenegro, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
9  Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Perú, Venezuela, Costa 
Rica, México, Panamá, Jamaica 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
3  Tunisia, Cyprus, Malta 
South Asia  2  Sri Lanka, Pakistan 
 
 
For the quantitative analysis, we consider only three regions (East Asia and the Pacific, 
East Europe and Central Asia and Latin America and Caribbean) because the number of 
responses received from countries in the other three regions (Africa, South Asia and Middle East 
and North Africa) does not provide a minimum degree of confidence to draw conclusions and 
compare with other regions.  
Considering the sample as a whole, the number of responses is adequate and 
representative for the three regions selected. In relative terms, the International Competition 
Network, being the most active network of competition agencies, has –as of November 2003- 
forty three members
4 that can be categorized as transition or emerging economies. Thus, having 





III. Results: general questions 
 
                                                 
4 http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/icn_membership_list30.pdf 
5 If they are not representative, they are indicative of the kind of information that needs a deeper analysis in a future 
needs assessment.   5
a. Scope of competition laws 
 
The responses show that in the majority of countries lawmakers granted exemptions to 
certain economic sectors. Some exemptions are permanent while others are temporary. 
According to the responses, the latter are justified as being a concession granted to industries that 
need to adjust to a liberalization process. Unfortunately, no information was provided on the 
length of temporary exemptions. Competition laws include temporary and permanent exemptions 
in the three regions. Some of the exempted sectors are: 
Permanent: agriculture, labor market, financial markets, state-owned monopolies, water and 
sanitation, land passenger transport, electricity. 




  Countries in LAC tend to have competition laws that apply to all sectors. This result 
differs from ECA and EAP where half of the countries that responded the questionnaire have 
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b. Level of activity: mergers and acquisitions analyzed in the previous 12 months 
 
This question gives an idea of the workload a competition agency has in the area of 
mergers. Figure 2 shows that competition agencies can be divided in two groups, one that had to 
analyze more than 50 mergers last year and the other that dealt with less than ten. In ECA, the 
majority of agencies had to consider more than 50 mergers while in LAC most of the 
competition agencies analyzed less than 10 mergers. In EAP, half of the responses indicated a 




In the three regions there seems to be a clear dichotomy between agencies that analyze 
few cases and those that have to analyze a large (more than 50) quantity of mergers per year
6. 
Can this result be driven by the varying size of the economies?. To answer this question, we plot 
the size of the economy (measured by the gross national product
7) against the quantity of 
mergers. The trend shows a very weak relation between these two variables, implying that the 
                                                 
6 This argument assumes that last year was an “average year” and so gives an indication of the approximate number 
of mergers a competition agency analyzes every year. 
7 Source: World Bank database. 
Figure 2
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size of the economy can not explain the quantity of merger cases handled by a competition 
agency
8. 
Some competition laws set minimum annual revenue requirements of the merging parties 
for the competition agency to consider a merger, while others set requirements that mandate 
competition agencies to analyze almost all mergers in the economy, independently of their size. 
Given the lack of correlation between the level of economic activity and the number of mergers 
analyzed by competition agencies, we can safely argue that the workload of a competition 
agency is more influenced by the legal requirements embedded in competition laws than by the 







c. Anticompetitive conduct cases filed in the previous 12 months 
 
                                                 
8 The R
2 in the graph is 0,10. This value is upward biased because we excluded an average sized country that 
handled more than 1,700 mergers. Including this country the R
2 would be 0,06. 
9 A reinforcing factor of this result is the fact that no response is in the range “11-20 mergers” which would be the 
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In general, competition agencies have deadlines to approve/disapprove or condition 
mergers and acquisitions. That is not the case when dealing with anticompetitive conduct cases, 
which usually take more time to solve. This question refers to how many new anticompetitive 
conduct cases entered, during the previous 12 months, the pool of cases to be solved by the 
competition agency. 
A companion question asked how many of the new anticompetitive conducts cases fell in 
the category “excessive prices”. Some competition agencies consider cases of exploitative abuse 
of dominant position (prices considered “too high”) while others only admit cases of 
exclusionary abuse of dominant position
10 (conducts aimed at excluding from the market existing 
or potential competitors). It seems this question was not well understood and was ignored in 
most of the responses. The distinction of these two conducts has important implications for the 
role of a competition agency as a market regulator. If competition laws consider excessive prices 
as an abuse of dominant position, competition agencies have to invest in determining what prices 
are “fair” or what prices are “too high”. Implicitly, the task of a competition agency gets much 
closer to a typical regulator, whose job is to set prices in the market. In the United States and the 
European Commission, cases of excessive prices are considered only if these prices are the 
consequence of exclusionary conducts. It is important to note that those countries that reported 
the highest numbers of anticompetitive conduct cases mentioned that most of them where cases 
of excessive prices. Thus, competition laws that adopt the legal figure of excessive prices impose 




                                                 
10 For a detailed discussion of the definition of exploitative and exclusionary abuse of dominant position see “A 
Framework for the Design and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy”, The World Bank and OECD, 1998.   9
 
 
In ECA and LAC, most competition agencies received more than 20 new cases in the 
previous 12 months. In EAP competition agencies have to pass judgment for either too many or 
too few cases. The questionnaire does not provide the opportunity to disaggregate the responses 
by type of conduct (for instance bid-rigging, price fixing, market allocation, refusal to deal, 
predatory pricing, etc).  
 
 
d. Personnel in competition agencies and productivity indicators 
 
Do competition agencies have enough human resources? Are they over or under staffed? 
The average of responses for each region illustrate significant differences in total personnel 
employed in competition agencies. Agencies in the East Asia and Pacific region have four times 
more personnel than competition agencies in Latin America. It is clear from the information 
about number of mergers and anticompetitive cases previously reported that the observed 
difference in personnel across regions can not be explained by the level of activity competition 
agencies have in each regions. That is, competition agencies in EAP do not handle four times 
more cases than agencies in LAC or two times more cases than agencies in ECA. Part of the 
difference in total average personnel between EAP and the other regions is caused by the fact 
that some competition agencies in EAP have broader mandates that include “unfair business 
practices”, an area that requires significant personnel endowment. 
Figure 4
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Anticipating important differences in personnel, the questionnaire disaggregated total 
personnel in three categories: professionals, administrative and temporary staff. Professionals 
were subdivided in lawyers, accountants and economists. As shown in figure 6, administrative 
personnel weights heavily in EAP competition agencies, accounting for almost 65 percent of 
total personnel. Administrative personnel is also the most important category in the LAC region. 
Only in ECA there is more professional than administrative personnel. Lawyers and economists 
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  Ideally, we should be able to measure the productivity per analyst working in mergers 
and anticompetitive conduct cases. With the available data obtained from the responses, we can 
proxy productivity by the ratio of mergers and anticompetitive cases per lawyer and economist. 
Figures 7 and 8 show this ratio for all countries
11 that responded the questionnaire in the ECA, 
EAP and LAC regions. The main characteristic of this productivity variable is its significant 
variance in ECA and EAP. This variance is difficult to justify and leads to discard the variable 
“cases per lawyer (or economist)” as a valid indicator of productivity. The main drawback of this 
variable lies in the huge heterogeneity of mergers and anticompetitive conduct cases. If we 
consider merger cases, given that their nature and complexity vary significantly, competition 
agencies that have to deal with many “small” mergers need to have many employees, each in 
charge of many, but easy-to-handle mergers. Other agencies, that need to handle only a few 
mergers a year may have less employees but each of which may be assigned only one or two 
cases per year. Thus, a comparison of a productivity indicator measured by cases per employee 
could be seriously mislead. In other words, when analyzing the level of activity and productivity 
of personnel in competition agencies, we should account for the quality dimension as mergers 
                                                 
11 Country names can not be displayed for confidentiality reasons. 
Figure 6


































































































































































ECA LAC EAP  12
and anticompetitive conduct cases vary according to their complexity and the need to allocate 
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e. Relevance of selected infrastructure services for competition agencies 
 
Competition agencies had to assign a degree of relevance (6 most relevant, 1 not 
relevant) to a set of industries, including infrastructure services and other sectors where 
competition agencies have had to intervene frequently (supermarkets, health –pahrmaceuticals-, 
banking and agricultural products.). In emerging and transition countries, the division of labor 
between regulatory and competition agencies is a matter of continuous conflicts
12. Provided the 
most common areas of conflict are telecommunications, electricity and air, land and sea transport 
we only present the responses by region for these infrastructure sectors. 
As a general comment, the responses provided by countries in the EAP region are the 
lowest for all infrastructure sectors
13. A likely explanation for this result is the relatively lower 
                                                 
12 See Owen, Bruce M., "Competition Policy in Latin America" (October 2003). Stanford Law and Economics Olin 
Working Paper No. 268. 
13 The only exception is sea transport. The ECA responses are downward biased because many of the respondents 











Anticompetitive Conducts per Lawyers and Economists
Anticompetitive conducts per lawyer Anticompetitive conducts per economist  14
degree of private sector participation in the provision of infrastructure services combined with 




  On average, the telecommunications sector got the highest degree of relevance. The fast 
technological changes and the liberalization of this sector are bringing out new competition 
problems, most of them related to network access, pricing and market foreclosure. Electricity is a 
relevant area of work for competition agencies in the three regions, and face the same 
competition policy problems as the telecom sector; the unbundling between generation, transport 
and distribution of electricity services has created access problems in the market most prone to 
natural monopoly (transport) and concentration problems derived from mergers in the generation 
market For competition agencies in LAC, the priority seems to be all transport modes with 
special emphasis on domestic air transport, which was liberalized in most Latin American 
countries during the 1990s. 
 
 
IV. Results: lessons for the design of training courses 
 
a. Priorities for training content and training methods 
Figure 9
Relevance of Infrastructure sectors (weighted average). 
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The questionnaire had a long list of topics related to the most important areas of 
competition policy and respondents had to assign a value from six (very relevant) to one (not 
relevant) to each topic. In aggregate, responses convey a very clear message: competition 
agencies need to acquire technical knowledge in most of the areas strictly related to competition 
policy. When analyzing priorities, responses did not provide clear messages because most of the 
answers, in all regions, were rated 5 or 6. Even though the high ratings indicate that competition 
agencies recognize they need to improve their knowledge in many areas, they pose a problem 
because it is difficult to prioritize and determine focus areas. To address this problem, one 
question asked to rank the five most relevant topics, allowing the identification of priority areas. 
 
 
Table 2: Priorities by region (by order of importance) 
  ECA LAC  EAP 
First priority  Topics in horizontal mergers  Topics in anticompetitive 
conducts 
Second priority  Topics in vertical mergers  Topics in vertical mergers 
Third priority  Conceptual framework  Conceptual  framework 











Competition agencies in the three regions need training on conceptual issues in 
competition policy. The term conceptual does not mean introductory topics. In this category, the 
questionnaire includes fundamentals of pricing and market structure, natural monopoly theory 
and competition, demand elasticity, product differentiation, concentration indices and definition 
of relevant markets for antitrust purposes. All of these topics require advanced knowledge of 
economic theory and empirical economics, with emphasis on econometrics
14. 
  In ECA training priorities are in vertical and horizontal mergers while competition 
agencies in LAC consider vertical mergers to be a priority training topic as well but give more 
importance to anticompetitive conducts (predatory pricing, access to essential facilities, refusal 
to deal, reseal price maintenance, tie in sales). In EAP there is not a clear training priority; 
                                                 
14 Competition agencies need to use econometrics to estimate price elasticities of demand to define relevant markets.   16
however, legal aspects of mergers appear as a training capacity need, which is not the case for 
ECA and LAC. Summarizing, in all regions there is a significant demand for training on 
substance, on how to solve day-to-day technically challenging cases.  
The questionnaire asked respondents to identify methods they prefer to use in training 
their staff. Not surprisingly, the most preferred methods are practical and hands-on methods, 
particularly case studies. All other methods ranked quite high in the three regions, implying that 
competition agencies are open and willing to experiment with a variety of training methods.  
  When asked which countries/regions would provide relevant case studies, most 
competition agencies indicated they prefer the European Commission or the United States rather 
than countries with similar legal regimes or countries that speak the same language
15. In the case 
of ECA, the subset of countries in the category Accession Countries showed a clear preference 
for European Commission’s cases, which is an expected response.  
 
b. Target audience  
 
Should competition courses be attended exclusively by competition agencies’ personnel? 
Would competition agencies like to expand the traditional audience of competition policy 
courses to include representatives from regulatory agencies, the judicial branch of government, 







                                                 
15 Competition agencies in LAC were an exception because they indicated that Spain is usually used as a best 
practice source.    17
 
 
  The responses to this question express a clear message: competition agencies would like 
to include regulatory agencies and members of the judicial branch of government in competition 
policy training courses. The need to include them reflects the growing awareness of the 
complementarities among competition agencies, regulatory agencies and the judicial system to 
achieve an effective implementation of the competition laws. In emerging and transition 
countries, as well as in the developed countries, there is a growing concern about competition 
issues in network industries. Most of these industries, specially those providing infrastructure 
services, are regulated by a regulatory agency. Competition and regulatory agencies need to 
cooperate and work together to address common problems and challenges. The best way to foster 
a valuable cooperation is by sharing information and having a common set of technical 
knowledge that allows them to understand the work and challenges each other face. 
  At the same time, the responses were more hesitant when considering the inclusion of 
private sector lawyers, economic consulting firms and NGOs that protect consumers’ rights. It 
seems competition agencies in ECA and EAP would be willing to accept the participation of 
private sector lawyers, economists and NGOs while competition agencies in LAC are clearly 
more reluctant to accept them.  
Figure 10






















































































































Yes No  18
  With respect to professionals from within competition agencies, mid-level management 
and technical staff are the preferred audience rather than the heads of agencies. This reflects the 
presence of a strong demand for courses with technical content that can create day-to-day case-
solving capacity to permanent staff in competition agencies. 
There is not a clear preference for the duration of courses. Half of the respondents feel 
that one week is about right for training courses while the other half prefer two-week or even 
longer courses. This indicates that competition agencies are willing to train their professional 
staff, even if training requires that they be absent from their jobs for long periods of time. 
Although the significant willingness to invest in human capital put into words by 
competition agencies is a very positive sign, it will be very difficult to meet these needs since 
almost all the respondents, when asked how much would the agency be willing to pay per 
training day, answered “this agency does not have enough budget for training”. A possible 
criticism to this response is the lack of incentives competition agencies have to reveal their true 
willingness to pay. The World Bank is an important donor and a needs assessment questionnaire 
sent by this institution may be perceived as the first step for a free of charge course. It remains as 
a pending, and very difficult task, the identification of competition agencies’ true willingness to 
pay for competition policy courses. 
 
V. Policy Implications 
 
  From the analysis of the needs assessment questionnaire we can derive some policies that 
would foster the interaction and cooperation among competition agencies and improve their 
performance. It seems that some harmonization and convergence of objectives in competition 
laws should be achieved. This would facilitate the provision of help from competition agencies 
in developed countries –which have more resources and experience in competition issues- to 
competition agencies in emerging and transition countries. Besides, it would avoid potential 
conflicts between competition agencies when a merger calls for a definition of a relevant market 
greater than the geographical limits of a given country. This task is not easy, as laws evolve in 
different environments and respond to demands and pressures from many conflicting interest 
groups. Areas that need harmonization include: convenience of giving privileges to economic   19
sectors (temporary or permanent exemptions), need to redefine the legal figure of “excessive 
prices” and time limits to pass judgment on mergers and acquisitions. 
  The interaction between regulators and competition agencies needs to be improved. 
Competition and sector specific regulation laws need to clearly define jurisdictions over topics 
and set the mechanisms to improve the cooperation between regulators and competition 
agencies. 
  In order to be able to implement policy changes, the role of multilateral organizations 
(World Bank, UNCTAD, OECD, and others), networks of competition agencies (for instance, 
the International Competition Network) and competition agencies from developed countries is 




The responses to the competition policy needs assessment questionnaire provide valuable 
information about characteristics of competition agencies -personnel endowment, level of 
activity in mergers and anticompetitive conduct cases, sectors exempted from the competition 
laws, priority infrastructure services, and others. More importantly, responses provide valuable 
information to identify capacity needs and give a precise guideline for the design of competition 
policy courses. Responses confirmed the growing importance of competition policy issues in 
infrastructure services and the need to foster coordination between sector regulators and 
competition agencies. 
The main findings can be summarizes as follows: 
1) Design of competition policy courses: (a) content: competition agencies do not need 
introductory courses. That is, there is a significant demand for training on substance, on how to 
solve day-to-day technically challenging issues; (b) training methods: practical and hands-on are 
the preferred methods. Competition agencies indicated they prefer cases from the European 
Commission or the United States rather than those from countries with similar legal regimes or 
countries that speak the same language; (c) training audience: competition policy courses should 
be expanded to include members of the judicial branch of government and regulatory agencies. 
Within competition agencies, mid-level management and technical staff rather than heads of 
agencies are the preferred audience; and (d) budget for training: although investment in human   20
capital seems to be a priority and competition agencies recognize it is a necessary condition to 
improve performance, almost all responses indicated, when asked how much are they willing to 
pay for training courses, that “this agency does not have enough budget for training”. 
2) Priority infrastructure sectors: the telecom and electricity sectors are a priority across 
all regions. Transport is also a priority in LAC. 
  3) Workload: competition agencies across countries and regions have different mandates. 
Some competition laws impose an ex-ante control of all mergers in the economy, while others set 
rules that lead the competition authority to review only a few mergers per year. This fact plus the 
lack of a strong relation between the size of the economy and the number of mergers per year 
allowed us to conclude that the workload of a competition agency is, to a great extent, 
determined by the competition laws.  
4) Personnel: the average endowment of personnel in competition agencies varies 
significantly across regions. We defined and computed proxy productivity variables “mergers per 
lawyer (economist)” and “anticompetitive conduct cases per lawyer (economist)”. However, no 
clear conclusion can be obtained because a labor productivity variable for competition agencies 
cannot ignore the quality dimension, that is, the inherent varying complexity of mergers and 
anticompetitive conduct cases.  
It must be highlighted that competition advocacy, an area where competition agencies are 
investing more time and financial resources, was explicitly not included in the questionnaire. 
Given that The International Competition Network conducted during 2002 a detailed 
questionnaire on this topic,
16 we considered it was not appropriate to ask competition agencies to 
respond to two questionnaires on the same topic. Provided competition advocacy implies a 
broader and more general role for competition agencies -as they intervene in areas like design of 
regulatory frameworks, trade liberalization, and state aid- it must be included in the design of 




                                                 
16 Available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org   21
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Please return this questionnaire by:  
 
The World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW  
MSN J3-304, Washington DC 20433 
Telephone: Fax:  
 
 COMPETITION POLICY 
 
-- NEEDS ASSESSMENT -- 
 
I.  BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1. Country: ________________________________________________________________________ 
2.  Name of Agency ________________________________________________________ 
 








5. What are the key areas of responsibility of your agency? (please explain) 
Control of Mergers and Acquisitions _____________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 






6.  Please indicate how many mergers your agency had to analyze in the last 12 months?. 
________________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________ 




8. What percentage of your answer to 7 are cases of “excessive pricing”? 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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10.  Does your staff have access to training courses on competition policy? Yes        No    










_______   24
II.  IDENTIFICATION OF SPECIFIC TRAINING NEEDS 
 
Based on your agency’s role, responsibilities and skill profile, how relevant are the following topics for a 
training program on competition policy? 
 
 
                   very relevant           6     5     4     3      2     1     not 
relevant 
 
A.   Principles & Techniques of Competition Policy 
 
12.  Global & Regional Trends in Infrastructure Privatization 
  a. Global trends in private infrastructure, utility diversification, 
        regulatory reform and  market  deregulation.                                
 
13.  Conceptual Framework for Competition Policy 
  a. Fundamentals of pricing and market structure                                   
  b. Concept of efficiency and measurement of Dead Weight Loss                              
  c. Natural monopoly theory and competition                                   
  d. Demand elasticity and product  differentiation                                
  e. Concentration indices and definition of relevant market                              
  f. Structure Conduct Performance Paradigm and its evolution                               
 
14. Topics in Horizontal Mergers 
  a. Definition of entry barriers 
      (legal and strategic)                                      
  b. Concepts of game theory applied to merger analysis                                 
  c. Dynamic pricing: conditions that favor collusion in 
      the relevant market (e.g. public information, capacity utilization)                             
  d. Efficiencies: what should be consider efficiency gains in a merger?                             
  e.  Failing  Firm  Doctrine                                   
  f. Impose conditions to approve merger (i.e. sale of specific assets)                             
  g.  Conglomerates                                    
 
 
15. Topics in Vertical Mergers 
  a. Theory of vertical integration                                       
  b.  Price  discrimination                                   
  c .   A c c e s s   p r i c i n g                                     
  d. Efficiency gains from vertical  integration                                
 
 
Annex to 14 and 15. Legal aspects in Horizontal and Vertical Mergers 
  a. Procedural issues (due process)                                      
  b. Information disclosure (handling confidential information)                               
  c. Enforcement of divestiture orders                                     
  d. Topics related to qualitative and quantitative evidence                                
 
   25
 
16. Topics in anticompetitive conducts 
  a.  Predatory  pricing                                  
  b. Access: Essential Facility                                    
  c .   R e f u s a l   t o   d e a l                                     
  d.  Resale  Price  Maintenance                                  
  e .   T i e   i n   S a l e s                                     
 
 
B.   Competition Institutions 
                very relevant  6    5    4     3    2     1  not 
relevant 
 
17. Design and Management of Competition Institutions 
  a. Establishment of competition institutions 
      (independence/accountability; commitment/flexibility)                               
  b. Comparative design and rules of competition agencies in 
       different countries                                         
  d. Financial management (funding, budgeting, accounting)                               
 
18 Management of ‘External Relations’ 
a. Management of relations with consumers associations, investors 
    and  industry  groups                                   
  b. Management of relations with the government and other  
       regulatory bodies (e.g.,  regulatory  agencies)                                
  c. Negotiation skills for competition agencies decision makers  
       (e.g., conflict resolution,  consensus building)                                  
 
19. What industries are of particular interest to your agency? 
 
Telecommunications                                    
Energy 
 O i l                                      
 E l e c t r i c i t y                                     
 N a t u r a l   G a s   a n d   L P G                                    
C a b l e   T V                                      
Transportation 
 A i r                                      
 Land  (bus  and  rail)                                   
 S e a                                      
S u p e r m a r k e t s                                      
Agricultural  products/inputs                                   
Health  (pharmaceuticals)                                   
Financial  Sector                                    
 
Please list other relevant markets: 
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20 Do you consider the following topics to be relevant? 
Design of interviews for competitors/ suppliers/ clients                                 
Design of questionnaires for merging firms                                     
Steps to improve efficiency and speed of mergers investigations                              
How to (methodology) investigate cases of predatory pricing                               
How to collect evidence when collusion is suspected                                 
 
 
21. Which of the following countries/regions do you think would provide 
       relevant case studies to your agency? 
United States (DOJ and FTC)                                      
 European  Commission                                 
 Countries  with  similar  legal  regime                                 
  Countries that speak the same language                                   
 
 
22.  Please rank the top five areas (consider areas 12 to 20 used above) where your staff would benefit 









D.  Other Suggestions 
 





__________________________________________________________________________________   27
III.  TRAINING FORMAT 
 
                        prefer most      6     5    4    3    2    1  prefer least 
24. What teaching methods would you prefer? 
  a.  Lectures                                     
  b. Case studies based on concrete examples                                   
  c. Problem solving in small groups                                     
  d. Simulation exercises (e.g., witness interviews)                                 
  e. Role plays (e.g., on negotiations)                                     
  f. Presentations by decision makers in competition agencies                               
  g. Presentation by the private sector: lawyers and economists  
        specialized in competition policy                                     
  h.  Presentation  by  participants                                  
  i. Discussion with other course  participants                                
 
 





26. Would you be willing to present your country’s experience in  competition policy?  Yes         No    
 













       
         
Financial aspects         
         
Legal issues in 
Competition Policy 
       
 
 
IV.  PARTICIPATION 
 
28. At what staff level should such a training course be targeted? 
      Head of Agency or Government Department 
     Mid-level management  
      Technical staff 
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29. How many participants do you think would provide the ideal learning environment? 
      20 - 30 
      30 - 40  
      40 - 45 
 
30. Do you consider the training course should be open to: 
 r e g u l a t o r y   a g e n c i e s          Y e s         No    
 members  of  the  judicial  system       Yes        No    
 NGO  that  protect  consumers  interests     Yes        No    
 economic  consulting  firms        Yes        No    
 l a w y e r s          Y e s         No    
 
31. For how many days do you think the training course should last? 
  3 days        1 week        2 weeks       longer  ______ 
 
32. How much would you be willing to pay per person per training day (excluding logistics, in US 
dollars). This information will be determinant for the course to be offered. 
    150 
    200 
    250 
    300 
    This agency does not have enough budget for training 
 





33. What would be the best time for you to attend a training course on competition policy? 
  June 03       August 03        September  03         October  03     
 
Please provide the name and contact information of the person in charge of answering this questionnaire: 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you very much for your help!! 
 
 
 